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TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL MODEL OF CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
The Cultural Implicatr*ons
Thorsten Hisam and Steven Hampton

One tool used to increase safety in the aviation industry is a training and operations model called Crew
Resource Management (CRM). The model's human factors approach to training and operating was
developed in the United States but has gained acceptance worldwide. Domestic research on CRM in the
United States is limited and international research is almost nonexistent. Because we do not know the degree
to which the CRM model developed in the American culture is applicable in other cultures, research is
needed to verify its level of universality across different cultural norms.
This paper compares the various components of the CRM model as developed in the United States and
used worldwide on a theoretical basis. Various cultural models from the classical international management
theorists are compared to the CRM model as a theoretical test of its applicability across cultures. Significant
potential weaknesses are discovered in the CRM programs as they are applied cross-culturally.
Recommendations for possible future resolutions to these weaknesses are presented.
INTRODUCTION

Both academics and practitioners concerned with
aviation safety have embraced CRM as a valuable tool in
reducing human factor accidents specifically and thereby
aviation accidents as a whole. CRM programs are
mandated in the United States by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and have been adopted by all
major airlines and regional airlines, as well as by many
corporate and smaller aircraft operators. CRM's
significance to aviation safety is supported by academic
literature, trade journals, aircraft operators, and pilots. Its
success has been so universal that it is already spilling
over into related and unrelated industries, including
aviation maintenance, air traffic control, and medicine.
Internationally, the aviation community also is embracing
CRM concepts. The International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) recommends further regulations to
facilitate CRM training worldwide (Maurino, 1993). As
all industries move toward globalization, the aviation
industry also will continue to globalize. This process will
continue to increase the cultural diversity in the cockpit
so that different cultures will affect CRM not only across
borders, but also within the cockpit.
The United States leads the world in aviation human
factors research and the American aviation industry has
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the most developed CRM programs. As aviation
organizations around the world embrace CRM as a tool
in reducing human factor causes of aviation accidents, the
tendency has been to try to adopt the CRM model
developed in the United States (Eissfeldt, Goeters,
Hoermann, Maschke, & Schiewe, 1995; Maurino, 1993).
Worldwide cultural differences, however, affect the
behavior of pilots. Because CRM attempts to modify
pilot behavior, it is logical to assume that CRM will have
different effects in different cultures. The literature refers
to the United States as the country that is least cultureconscious in the world. Few people in the United States
take an active interest in learning about other countries,
cultures, and languages (Adler, 1991). This description of
the United States does not create confidence in the
universal applicability of the American model of CRM.
Research is needed to tie cultural models to aviation
human factors and CRM so that the variability among
cultures can lead to synergy in the cockpit (Redding &
Ogilvie, 1984). In addition, research is needed to
determine the best method for implementing CRM
concepts across cultures. The need is evident in the
literature. Swierczek (1988) analyzed the Thai and
American cultures and found significant differences in
interactive situations, particularly communications,
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conflict resolution, and interpersonal relations. These are
key elements t o CRM and aviation safety. Smith and
Tayeb (1988) also found differences in leadership styles
across cultures. Leadership is another key element of
CRM, and another study found that standard operating
procedures (SOP'S) are subject to cultural variation.
SOP'S, widely used in aviation and often considered
universal, were found to contain definitional diversity and
a variety of applications by crewrnembers (Degani &
Wiener, 1991). Pun (1990) tells us that many current
CRM training programs will not transfer across cultures,
and Guptara and Murray (1990) argued that CRM
techniques will be ineffective in some cultures because
the techniques are predicated on assumptions that lack
universal validity. Furthermore, almost no research on
CRM has been done outside the United States (Johnston,
1993). In fact, the management literature on cultural
issues rarely addresses Latin American and African
issues. Emerging nations in these regions have up to
eight times the human factor error rate than that of most
industrialized nations (Barnett & Higgins, 1989; Wiener,
1990).
The purpose of this paper is to examine the CRM
model and its components in the light of various cultural
models found in the management literature. Theoretical
links are established between cultural models and CRM
to where and how the present CRM model may apply.
Cultural constructs are described along their scales of
variance among cultures. Though specific countries are
mentioned frequently and an effort is made to compare
the United States' cultural impact on the CRM model,
this paper does not attempt to predict the likelihood of
CRM concepts being successful in any specific culture.
That is beyond the present scope and a single paper
could only hope to examine one culture in such detail.
This paper will address CRM's applicabilityacross known
cultural scales and will provide recommendations for the
implementation of CRM on a global scale.
A brief description of the CRM model precedes the
discussion of various cultural models from the
management literature. Each cultural model's theoretical
impact o n CRM is discussed. Select CRM components
are also discussed within the boundaries of cultural
theory. Recommendations are provided to facilitate the
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implementation of CRM programs across cultures to
create a cultural synergy in the cockpit.
CREW RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Though formerly limited to the flight crew, CRM
programs are now designed to spill over into all areas of
the aviation organization to include, but not be limited
to, aircraft dispatchers, maintenance technicians, and
flight attendants. CRM refers to the effective use of all
available resources. These include human resources,
hardware, and software. CRM is used to bring the
human/machine interface and interpersonal activities
closer to optimization (FAA, 1995). CRM objectives also
have been reported to influence cockpit actions and pilot
attitudes while sustaining and improving decision-making
and overall communications (Foushee, 1982, 1984,
Helmreich & Hackman, 1984; Johnston, 1993).
Furthermore, evidence for the connection between CRM
deficiencies and human error accidents among U.S.
carriers is supported by Ruffell Smith (1979), Cooper,
White, and Lauber (1979), Murphy (1980), and Foushee
and Manos (1981).
There are various CRM programs among the numerous
air carriers in the United States and worldwide with
significant differences among programs. However, certain
components seem universal. These components were
published by the FAA as guidelines for Part 121 and Part
135 air carriers in an advisory circular in 1993 (AC 12051A) and superseded in 1995 by AC 120-51B. Further
information about the CRM model envisioned by the
FAA is presented in DOT-VNTSC-FAA-92-8, a report
titled "Crew Resource Management: An Introductory
H a n d b o o k W y the DOT-FAA Research and
Developement Service (Driskell & Adams, 1m).This
paper will use the CRM model as put forth by the FAA
as the CRM model used in comparison with cultural
constructs. It is important to note that variations in
programs exist, however. The FAA model was chosen as
the most representative of industry norms.
CRM Components
CRM programs should include several components as
curriculum topics. These components are designed to
change pilot behavior. They consist of the following
topics and subtopics:
1. Communication processes and decision behavior
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a. Briefings
b. Inquiry/advocacy/assertion
c. Crew self-critique (decisions and actions)
d. Conflict resolution
e. Communications and decision-making
2. Team-building and maintenance
a. Leadership/followership
b. Interpersonal relationships/group climate
c. Workload management and situational
awareness
d. Individual factors/stress reduction (Driskell &
Adams, 1992; FAA, AC 120-51B)
CRM recognizes the need for strong technical skills,
and then augments those skills with soft skills as listed
above. All of these components are deeply rooted in
culture and will be discussed in that light later. The
following are definitions of the CRM terms used above
and are included for clarification of references to those
terms in this paper.
Briefings: Structured communications between
crewmembers usually preceding a key event such as a
take-off, approach, or landing, but not limited to those.
Inquiry, advocacy, and assertion:Crewmember behavior
that is acceptable at times when a crewmember feels a
course of action is best, even though there may be
conflict among crewmembers. They affect interpersonal
relations, teamwork, and the captain's authority.
Crew self-critique: The crewrnembers are evaluating
their decisions and actions themselves so that the skill
can better transfer from training to flightline activities.
Conflict resolution: Techniques for resolving
disagreements among crewmembers.
Communications: Effective techniques of filtering
information, transmitting information, and seeking
information while minimizing biases and barriers.
Decision-making: Operational models for judgment in
an effort to involve everyone who can help. This also
involves the optimum management of informational
resources.
Team-building: Improving interpersonal relationships
and practices. Synergies should be achieved in the group.
Leadership and followership: Attempts to achieve
effective leadership by providing the proper balance
between respect for authority and assertiveness. The
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primary goal for everyone is the safe and efficient
operation of the aircraft.
Interpersonal relationships and the group climate: This
area emphasizes sensitivity to other crewmembers' styles
and personalities in the hope of maintaining a friendly
and relaxed tone among crewrnembers.
Workload management: The proper division of duties
among crewmembers and the anticipation of
contingencies. Concepts include preparation, planning,
vigilance, workload distribution, and distraction
avoidance.
Individual factors and stress reduction: This area
emphasizes the effects of stress and fatigue on the
performance of flight duties in an attempt to reduce their
ill effects.
CRM Characteristics
CRM is defined by the following characteristics:
1. CRM is a comprehensive system of applying human
factors concepts to improve crew performance.
2. CRM embraces all operational personnel.
3. CRM can be blended into all forms of aircrew
training.
4. CRM concentrates on crewmembers' attitudes and
behaviors and their impact on safety.
5. CRM uses the crew as the unit for training.
6. CRM is training that requires the active participation
of all crewmembers (FAA, AC 120-51B, 1995).
Fundamentals of CRM Implementation
The following practices are recommended for aviation
organizations planning to implement CRM programs:
1. Assess the status of the organization before
implementation.
2. Get commitment from all managers, starting with
senior managers.
3. Customize the program to reflect the nature and
needs of the organization.
4. Define the scope of the program.
5. Communicate the nature and the scope of the
program before startup.
6. Institute quality control procedures.
7. Evaluate and analyze the entire program.
These recommendations are very similar to
recommendations commonly made to firms undertaking
organizational culture shifts to Total Quality
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Management (TQM) processes. In fact, there are strong
parallels between CRM and TQM. TQM has been found
to not be universally applicable across cultures (Kolesar,
1993). The link between the two concepts leads us to
believe that CRM also may not be universally applicable
across cultures.
CRM and Behavior
CRM focuses on influencing the behavior of
participants. The aviation organization uses CRM
training to create a CRM environment that reinforces the
desirable crewmember behavior discussed earlier.
Crewmember behavior is then continually evaluated and
further reinforced with training based on the evaluation.
A good CRM program maintains a detailed, quantitative
database on outcomes assessment, much like TQM
programs do. A model of the relationship would look
like this:

Evaluation
CRM Training

THEORETICAL LINK
The impact of culture on behavior is great. There are
many models for evaluating this significance. A simple,
but universal, model was provided by Adler (1991):

Culture
values

This paper will create a theoretical link between CRM's
impact on behavior and cultural effects on behavior, in
effect creating a model which would look like the
following:
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CRM ~ G i n i n n

Culture
Behavior

Values

-

CRM program

Attitudes

This theoretical model shows that crewmember
behavior cannot be influenced by a CRM program
without the consideration of cultural factors. Culture is
a universal trait in that it exists for everyone. In the
absence of a CRM program, this model indicates that
culture will still affect behavior. Obviously, there are
other influences on behavior that cannot be covered by
the broad concept we call culture, but those are beyond
the scope of this paper. We will concern ourselves with
the impact of culture on crewrnember behavior and the
implications of culture on CRM programs.

CULTURE
Behavior

Behayior

Evaluation

There are many cultural models in the conventional
management literature. All of these models attempt to
categorize human behavior among a set of scales. Each
scale has extremes at each end and more moderate
cultural norms in the middle. Examples of such scales
include the conceptualization of time and space, lowversus high-context communications, uncertainty
avoidance, and numerous others. We will examine models
of a selected group and discuss how the behaviors along
the models' scales may affect CRM as defined above.
The following discussion begins with a general view of
cultural scales presented by Hall (1959, 1966, 1976,
1983). Another overall view of culture was presented by
Herskovitz (1952) and has been noted in the literature
many times since. A third model was presented by
Hofstede (1980a, 1980b, 1983, 1984, 1991). It shifts the
emphasis of the model to the impact on management and
organizational behavior. It also provides interesting
insights into CRM and has been noted in the literature
in concert with aviation human factors (Johnston, 1993;
Phelan, 1994). We will examine the CRM model in the
light of each management model.
Several components of CRM, including organizational
synergy, motivation, and decision-making, are explained
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by cultural researchers in various models. These models
have been thoroughly tested and are considered mature.
We will apply the models to CRM. Recommendations for
practitioners and researchers conclude this paper.
Hall's Discussion of Cultural Scales
The cultural scales described by Hall include variances
in the formalities of relationships, the contexts of
communications, the concepts of space and time, the
flows of information, and the processes of action chains.
Each scale is addressed below in reference to its
theoretical impact on CRM. The scales are discussed in
terms of generalities. It is important to note that
exceptions will exist in all cases, particularly in cultures
where there are numerous subcultures.
Hall describes the formalities of relationships in terms
of fast and slow messages. People in cultures
characterized by fast messages generally form more
informal, superficial relationships. In contrast, cultures
characterized by slow messages foster deeper, long-term
relationships. Examples of fast-message cultures include
the United States and Canada. Slow-message cultures
exist throughout Europe and the Middle East (Hall,
1983). Fast-message cultures accept the use of
informalities more than do slow-message cultures; thus,
the atmosphere in the aircraft cockpit will be different.
An American crew may be on a first-name basis before
the end of the first layover, while a European crew may
fly together for years and continue to communicate more
formally. These differences will affect the concepts of
leadership, communications models, and conflictresolution models.
The context of communications has been scaled among
cultures to range from low-context cultures to highcontext cultures. Low-context cultures tend to base most
of their communications on the words that are spoken,
while high-context cultures communicate more from
within and place less emphasis on the actual words (Hall,
1976). The United States and Germany are examples of
low-context cultures. Asia and the Middle East, as well as
some European cultures, are characterized by highcontext communications (Adler, 1984). The implications
o n communications, briefings, conflict resolution, and
teamwork should be obvious. The communication model
for CRM applies well in the United States, but does not
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take into account the additional variables created by
high-context communications.
The concept of space can be divided into the subtopics
of territoriality (personal space) and the multisensory
spatial experience. Territoriality refers to the individual's
tendency to label personal space. Americans and
Germans, for example, tend to require greater personal
space than do Latin Americans or Arabs. People of
cultures that have a higher affinity for territoriality often
will get uncomfortable when their personal space is
invaded, a reaction that people of cultures requiring less
personal space often find insulting (Hall, 1966, 1976).
The territoriality scale can affect communications,
relationships, teamwork, leadership, and conflict
resolution in the CRM model. The multisensory spatial
experience refers to an individual's openness to
interruptions when working or communicating. Some
cultures tend to be very inflexible in this regard, shunning
any interruption and losing their momentum in the task
when distracted. Germans and Americans tend to be the
most inflexible (Hall & Hall, 1990). Other cultures exist
in a constant state of distraction and thrive on the open
information flow. Examples include the French and
Arabs (Hall & Hall, 1990). These differences will affect
pilots. For example, an American pilot who flies with a
Saudi crew encounters what he perceives to be confusion
and lack of organization in the cockpit. The concept of
a sterile cockpit may be completely different in other
cultures.
The concept of time also can be divided into subtopics.
One cultural scale of time divides cultures into various
degrees of monochronic or polychronic tendencies.
Monochronic cultures do one thing at a time, concentrate
on that job, make deadlines, are low-context
communicators, are committed to the job, adhere to
plans, dislike interruptions, emphasize promptness, and
tend to make short-term relationships. Polychronic
cultures do many things at once, meet deadlines if
possible, are high-context communicators, are committed
to people, change plans often, base promptness on the
relationship, and build lifetime friendships (Hall & Hall,
1990). We can see strong parallels with the other cultural
scales presented. This variability in the perception of
time will affect CRM's applicability across cultures,
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because it causes people to view relationships and tasks
differently. Polychronic cultures (Asia and the Middle
East, for example) will prioritize their actions around
people, while monochronic cultures (such as Germany
and the United States) will prioritize their actions around
tasks, plans, and deadlines. This variability in priorities
will affect the applicability of CRM by varying the
emphasis placed on its components and by varying the
reasons people do certain things. A second cultural scale
of time refers to an individual's orientation in viewing
time. Cultures can be past-oriented (Asia, the Middle
East, Germany), future-oriented (United States) or
present-oriented (Latin America). This orientationaffects
the individual's frame of reference for decision-making
(Hall, 1983). A German will review the history
surrounding a certain action, an American will tend to
predict the action's outcome, and a Latin American will
assess the action's present feasibility. The implicationson
the CRM component of decision-making and judgment
are obvious.
Information flow is affected by Hall's models as well.
Information does not flow as easily in low-context
cultures as it does in high-context cultures. Low-context
communication, such as in Germany and the United
States, tends to be more focused and controlled, while
information in a high-context society almost tends to take
on a life of its own. Information flow is not impeded by
rules, procedures, or protocol (Hall & Hall, 1990). The
communication model and the structured briefings called
for by the CRM model endorsed by the FAA may not
apply or be necessary in a high-context culture. At the
very least, we can assume that optimum information flow
will likely be achieved through a different model.
Action chains are equally as important in aviation as is
information flow. Action chains in this sense refer to
established sequences of procedures. The accurate
execution of such action chains is critical in the cockpit.
The use of documented procedures is an essential
element of CRM and important in workload
management. Hall and Hall (1990) report that lowcontext cultures tend to be more dependent on action
chains and procedures and also more prone to errors
resulting from interruptions. There is a close relationship
to the multisensory spatial experience discussed earlier.

Flight crews from the United States and other lowcontext societies will have a higher risk factor related to
procedural mistakes than will flight crews from highcontext societies. It is logical to assume that a CRM
program in a low-context culture should have a higher
emphasis on procedures to prevent pilot errors. Emphasis
in a program for high-context communicators may be
shifted to another area.
Herskovitz's Five Dimensions of Culture
Herskovitz presents us with another classical model of
cultural norms. He breaks cultural differences into five
dimensions (Herskovitz, 1952):
1. The material culture
2. Social institutions
3. Man and the universe
4. Aesthetics
5. Language
We describe each and address its implication for the
universal application of the CRM model.
The concept of the material culture in Herskovitz's
model refers to the importance of technology and
economics in a society. Generally, the more industrialized
a country is, the more importance the material culture
holds (Herskovitz, 1952). Aviation is heavily impacted by
technology and economics, but there is no strong, evident
link between the material-culture concept and the CRM
model. Aviators, by virtue of their profession, will have
to embrace technology to a certain degree in every
culture. Thus, the material-culture effect in a developing
country may not impact the aviation community as
heavily as other sectors of the society (agriculture,
construction, etc.). If there are any variations to the
universal application of the CRM model resulting from
this construct, they will most likely impact decisionmaking models.
The norms surrounding social institutions make up
Herskovitz's second dimension of culture. He refers to
the priorities of government, religion, and business in a
culture. These priorities are reflected in the culture's
ethics and customs. For example, Asians tend to have
paternalistic social institutions, American social
institutions celebrate individualism, and the people of
India have developed a system of social institutions
driven largely by nepotism (Herskovitz, 1952). These

-
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concepts describe some of the underlying philosophies
that drive the customs of a culture. They are applicable
to all areas contained in the CRM model in some way.
The model developed by the people of an individualistic
culture, the United States, may require extensive
modification before it can be exported to Japan, where
the concepts of team-building, leadership, and
communication are vastly different.
Herskovitz calls his third dimension "man and the
universe." This concept refers to how people view
themselves in the spiritual world, and encompasses
religion and superstition. In some countries, spiritual
beliefs influence behavior greatly. Religion can affect all
institutions and even the law. Numerous examples exist
in Asia and the Middle East. In other countries, such as
the United States and most of Europe, religion and
superstition play a much smaller role, and may even be
specifically separated from the institutions of government
and law. The dimension of "man and the universenaffects
the causes of behavior and thereby some of the strongest
facets of culture. Large differences between cultures will
affect the CRM model by changing the motivations and
reasons for desired behaviors.
Aesthetics is the fourth dimension of culture in the
model. This cultural concept refers to art, literature,
music, and drama. Herskovitz states that this dimension
overlaps slightly with "man and the universen (1952, p.
17). Differences between cultures are great when viewed
through the eyes of an artist or art historian, but are not
very significant in their effect on workplace behavior.
There is an impact on language that has to be considered
for the CRM model, but when compared to the other
dimensions, the significance is reduced.
The fifth dimension reported by Herskovitz is language.
It overlaps with the "man and the universe" and aesthetics
dimensions. The language concept in the model includes
the words used, the implications beyond the words, and
body language. Once again great differences exist crossculturally. High-context cultures, such as the Chinese,
place much more emphasis on the the unspoken word
than low-context cultures do. In many cases the unspoken
word carries significantly more weight than the spoken
word. The unspoken word can come in the form of a
gesture, a look, or a more subtle implication, which often
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goes unnoticed to Westerners. A Chinese crewmember,
when asked by the captain whether he understands an
instruction, is most likely to say "yesneven if he did not
understand. Saying "no" might cause the captain to lose
face, because it implies that the instruction was not clear.
Such a situation is much less likely in the United States
and significantly affects inquiry, assertion, briefings, and
conflict resolution. The dimension of language will
impact the universal application of the CRM model
greatly.
Four out of five dimensions in Herskovitz's model
should affect the CRM model in cross-cultural situations.
Each dimension should be researched thoroughly to
determine the applicability of CRM concepts and how
changes may optimize the model.
Hofstede's Model

Hofstede presents four scales of culture and applies
them specifically to organizational behavior. His research
was among the most extensive ever conducted in
international organizational behavior and has been used
often in published research.
Hofstede's four cultural scales are:
1. Individualism/collectivism
2. Power distance
3. Uncertainty avoidance
4. MasculinityJfemininity (Hofstede, 1980a)
The scale identified by individualism and collectivism is
concerned with how people define themselves.
Individualism exists when people define themselves as
individuals. Examples include the United States and
Western Europe. Of all the countries in Hofstede's
sample, 50 countries in total, the United States and
Australia were tied for having the most individualistic
cultural trends. Behavior in individualistic cultures is
controlled through internal pressures such as guilt
(Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 1980a). Collectivism exists in
cultures characterized by tight social frameworks in which
people distinguish between groups and define themselves
through the group. Examples include Japan and most of
Asia. Determinism characterizes collectivist cultures,
where the will of the group determines the members'
beliefs and behaviors. Behavior is controlled through
external, societal pressure such as shame (Adler, 1991;
Hofstede, 1980a). CRM in the air-carrier setting is
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designed for the group. The American CRM model
includes components that are designed to overcome the
individualistic tendencies in the American culture. Such
components include teamwork, leadership, followership,
and conflict-resolutiontraining. Evidence from Hofstede's
research would indicate that members of collectivist
cultures might not need such training. They may already
be better prepared to act as a team. On the other hand,
they may also be more susceptible to groupthink and
need more training in decision-making, inqui~y, and
assertion. The CRM training model would once again
have to be adapted.
Hofstede's power distance scale measures the extent to
which less powerful members of organizations accept the
unequal distribution of power. In low-power distance
societies, such as Israel, Denmark, and Austria,
employees are expected to bypass their boss to get the
job done. High power distance cultures, such as India and
Venezuela, consider such behavior to be insubordination
(Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 1980a). The United States falls
toward the low end of this scale, but not in the extreme
(Hofstede, 1980b). One recent article reports that power
distance is the scale in Hofstede's model that will affect
CRM behaviors the most (Phelan, 1994). Concepts such
as the captain's authority, inquiry, assertion, and conflict
resolution will certainly be affected. Variations in
communication are also likely. The United States'
position toward the middle of the scale is encouraging for
the applicability of some of the CRM model, however.
Uncertainty avoidance is Hofstede's third scale. It refers
to the extent to which people in a culture will accept
ambiguous situations and the extent to which they will
avoid such situations through formal rules and the
rejection of deviant ideas. Hofstede was primarily
referring to the certainty of employment and the concept
of lifetime employment in high uncertainty avoidance
countries (Adler, 1991; Hofstede, 1980a). It is not clear
whether the scale can be extended into the cockpit
management setting, but the literature does include some
suggestions that it can (Phelan, 1994). Once again, the
United States falls toward the center of the scale
(Hofstede, 1980b). One might conclude that high
uncertainty avoidance societies may be more likely to
establish strict procedures for pilots and may depend
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more heavily on standardization. Low uncertainty
avoidance cultures might be more likely to allow
variances from procedures in their training. The CRM
model emphasizes the use of standardized procedures and
sound decision-makingin the event that a situation is not
covered by the policies. The United States' position in
the middle of the scale and the CRM model seem to
indicate that Hofstede's scale may apply t o the cockpit,
because the model suggests a compromise position in
concert with the cultural scale.
Hofstede calls his fourth cultural scale
masculinitylfemininity. In short, he reports that masculine
societies define gender roles more rigidly than do
feminine societies. The Scandinavian countries are
reported to be the most feminine, Japan and Australia
the most masculine, and the United States slightly
masculine among Hofstede's sample (Adler, 1991;
Hofstede, 1980a). The Middle East was not wellrepresented in Hofstede's study, but reports of culturally
based behavior in this region also suggest strong
masculinity in the society. The CRM model is genderneutral. The model even discourages gender bias through
its emphasis on teamwork Every crewmember is valued,
regardless of gender. In Hofstede's model, the CRM
model would be defined as highly feminine. This leads us
to believe that the masculinitylfemininity scale differences
among cultures should not affect the CRM model's
applicability in feminist to slightly masculine cultures. It
would have to be tested in a more masculine
environment and may require some modification there.
Additional reinforcement of CRM components may be
necessary in a very masculine culture to make a male
captain respect the input from a female first officer, for
example.
Organizational Synergy and Cultural Diversity
Synergistic effects are more of a goal of CRM than a
component. The literature addresses cultural synergy by
identifying advantages and disadvantages of
multiculturalism.
Culturally synergistic advantages to organizational
behavior include:
1. Expanding meanings
a. Multiple perspectives
b. Greater openness to new ideas

t
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c. Multiple interpretations
2. Expanding alternatives
a. Increasing creativity
b. Increasing flexibility
c. Improving problem-solving skills
3. Enhanced attention to others'
a. Ideas
b. Meanings
c. Arguments
Disadvantages of cultural diversity to organizational
behavior include:
1. Increases in
a. Ambiguity
b. Complexity
c. Confusion
2. Communications become more difficult
a. Miscommunication
b. Often hard to reach a single agreement
3. Hard to agree on specific actions
4. Mistrust among members (Adler, 1991)
All the items reported by Adler will impact CRM. The
advantages represent exactly what is sought through the
CRM model: better problem-solving through open
communication, reflecting various viewpoints and all of
the available information. The disadvantages represent
difficulties in the same areas, decision-making and
communication. The challenge for CRM practitioners
and teachers is to develop a multicultural model that
addresses this potential conflict in a multicultural crew.
The model and the training can either greatly enhance
decision-making and communication in a culturally
diverse cockpit or a faulty application of the CRM model
may cause both to deteriorate. Cultural synergy is
reported to be attained when an organizational behavior
model, such as the CRM model, is based on, but not
limited to, the cultures involved and accepted by all the
participants (Burke & Goodstein, 1980). This would
suggest changes for the CRM model across cultures or
one CRM model with significant cultural flexibility built
in.
Kovach reported in his research that culturally diverse
teams working to solve technical problems will be either
highly effective or highly ineffective. Few multicultural
teams performed on an average level (Kovach, in Adler,
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1991). Kovach found that the teams that performed at
the highest levels were engaged in non-routine tasks that
required innovation. Those engaged in routine tasks were
less effective. This would suggest the need for
components in the CRM model to address multicultural
effectiveness during the 99 percent of flight time spent in
routine operations. Kovach also reported that the
effective teams had the following characteristics:
1. Recognized differences
2. Members selected on ability
3. Mutual respect
4. Equal power
5. Superordinate goal
Ineffective teams had other characteristics:
1. Ignored differences
2. Members selected on basis of ethnicity
3. Ethnocentrism
4. Cultural dominance
5. Individual goals
These findings would suggest a possible framework for
a component of a multicultural CRM model that
addresses the challenges of diversity in a variety of
situations.
Motivation Across Cultures
Motivation is extremely important to the understanding
of the training concepts and the behavior concepts of
CRM. Because motivation guides behavior, the actions
and attitudes of flight crewmembers will be dependent on
how they are motivated to act. Training involves learning,
which is defined as a change in behavior, and is therefore
equally dependent on motivational concepts. It appears
that without the proper motivational tools, a CRM
program will fail. Flight crews cannot be forced into a
CRM model. Crews have to embrace the concept. This is
the key to a successful program.
We will examine the motivation theories presented by
four prominent authors: Maslow, McClelland, Herzberg,
and Vroom. Each theorist's contribution to motivational
theory will be described and its applicability across
cultures analyzed.
Maslow presents a hierarchy of needs that motivate
behavior. Maslow's theory is based on Americans and
describes individualisticneeds as motivators (Adler, 1991;
Maslow, 1943). While the individual dominates the
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American culture, community dominates the cultures of
many societies, including those of Asia and eastern Africa
(Adler, 1991). Thus, Maslow's need hierarchy is weak
across cultures and will not support a cross-cultural CRM
model.
McClelland suggests three motives for workers:
achievement, power, and affiliation (McClelland, 1961).
His motivational model has been shown to be relatively
robust across cultures, but not universal (Adler, 1991).
Although it has a wider scope of application, it is not
comprehensive enough to provide a solid base for an
international CRM model. It could, however, serve as
part of a base model for motivation in cross-cultural
CRM.
Herzberg's two-factor theory suggested that the
extrinsic factors surrounding the work environment have
the power to demotivate individuals, while the intrinsic
factors within the job itself can motivate behavior
(Herzberg, 1%8). Herzberg's theory also was developed
in the United States and has been tested cross-culturally
without replication (Adler, 1991). In other words,
Herzberg's two-factor theory does not hold up crossculturally.
Therefore, CRM programs using solely intrinsic
motivators will not be applicable in all cultures. The
CRM model tested in this paper was developed largely
around intrinsic motivators, such as a safer flying
environment and a more efficient flight crew.
Vroom's expectancy theory claims that people are
motivated by the expectation that their actions will
produce results. Motivation is the result of the likelihood
that the action will produce the desired result combined
with the perceived value of that result (Vroom, 1%4).
The theory can be expressed as M=E*V, where M
represents motivation, E represents the likelihood of the
desirable outcome, and V represents the individual's
perceived value of that outcome. Although his concept
has been found to be highly applicable across cultures
(Adler, 1991), it is also important to note that rewards
vary greatly across cultures. The rewards of the CRM
model developed in the United States are intrinsic in
nature and have been shown, in the light of Herzberg's
work, to have varying degrees of perceived value crossculturally.
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These four theorists are those most often cited in
motivational research in the United States. Their
contributions do not, however, seem to apply consistently
across cultures. Motivation appears to be culture-bound.
It is logical to assume that motivational components of
a cross-cultural CRM model will have to be flexible
enough to vary between applications.
Decision-Making Across Cultures
Decision-making is a large component of CRM and
pilot training in general. Training programs attempt to
instill the proper judgment skills in a flight crewrnember
so that decisions will most likely be correct. Decisionmaking involves five basic steps: problem recognition,
information-gathering,alternatives development, choice,
and implementation.
Problem recognition varies across cultures because of
the varying concepts of destiny. Some cultures, including
some of those based on Islam, believe that some
situations should be accepted, rather than changed.
Americans are more self-reliant and individualistic.
Hence, the CRM model for decision-making accepts all
problems as changeable.
Information-gathering varies because some cultures
search for information through ideas and possibilities,
while Americans generally search for facts. The decisionmaking models in American CRM programs are based on
factual data-gathering.
Some cultures develop alternatives by searching
through the past and what has been, while others look
toward the future and what can be. Past-oriented
cultures, for example, tend to believe that adults cannot
change. This is a strong obstacle to CRM
implementation. The United States is generally a futureoriented culture.
The choice of decision can rest with the individual or
with the group. The CRM model tries to shift the
individualistic approach in the United States to more of
a group effort. This situation should apply crossculturally, then, though some cultures will need less
emphasis. The present emphasis in the CRM model is to
slow down the decision-making process, which may not
be necessary in communal cultures. The decision rule
also varies across cultures. Americans and other
individualistic cultures use decision rules testing for
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"true" versus "false."Some other societies apply decision
rules testing for "good" or "bad." The CRM model looks
for "true" or "false" and may require further definition or
flexibility in this area.
The implementation of decisions also varies between
individualistic and communal cultures. The principal
difference is the speed of implementation. Because the
implementation of aeronautical decisions for a flight crew
would more than likely all be relatively quick, this
variation across cultures should not affect the CRM
model greatly, if at all.
CONCLUSION
It appears that most cultural models, when applied to
the present CRM model, do not support its applicability
across cultures. Certain key elements addressed in CRM
have a wide range of behaviors cross-culturally.
Particularly the areas of interpersonal communication,
leadership, and group dynamics varied greatly along the
cultural scales reported by various theorists. These areas
are key elements of any aviation human factors (CRM)
program, as well as any aviation safety program in a crew
environment. Since these elements are addressed in the
CRM model from the American culture's perspective, we
must conclude that the CRM model's universality
worldwide is highly questionable. To complicate matters,
most theorists placed the American culture near one
extreme end of the cultural behavior scale. This suggests
that the .American CRM model's applicability in certain
cultures at the other end of the scale is even more
unlikely. The cultural models indicate that the CRM
model would have to be modified for different cultures,
particularly if near-optimum effects on the safety of flight
are desired. Of course, they always are.
Some airlines operating in societies outside the West-

ern cultures have decided to adopt the CRM principles
from the American model, planning to adjust their
cultural norms to the foreign model. No research is
available to indicate the effectiveness of this strategy, but,
at least in theory, we suggest that better results would be
obtained from adapting the CRM training and operating
programs to the cultural norms. The report of Burke and
Goodstein (1980) on cultural synergy supports this
assertion.
Research is needed to empirically test the assertions of
this work. The effectiveness of the CRM model in
cultures other than the United States should be tested.
The objectives of the research would include finding a
cultural scale for pilot and crew behaviors to determine
how far along the scale certain CRM components would
apply. Those components most critical to the safety of
flight in each culture should be found before
practitioners can develop training and operating
programs to address them. Critical factor areas should
then be measured to find both the desired behavior and
the general, present behavior in that culture. Only then
can program specifics be developed. Various crosscultural approaches to pilot training should be tested
individually as to their effectiveness.
Although a universal model of CRM appears unlikely,
a worldwide model with basic principles and individual
component programs can certainly be developed through
future efforts. Practitioners and theorists should agree on
basic guiding principles for the programs and individual
component modules should be developed to address the
critical factor areas for the safety of flight. Individual
component modules should include specific approaches
for specific cu1tures.O
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